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Abstract: There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there 
is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we 
human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I 
believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of 
the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking 
that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard 
conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself 
seems to take for granted. 
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Özet: McGinn’in gizemcilik adı verilen görüşü açısından iki iddia merkezi 
önemdedir: (1) zihin-beden probleminin doğalcı ve yapıcı bir çözümü vardır ve 
(2) insanlar zihin-beden problemini ilkesel olarak çözemezler. (1) ve (2), çelişik 
iki tez değildir: birinin doğruluğu diğerinin yanlış olmasını gerektirmez. Fakat 
savunacağım iddia odur ki, McGinn’in (2)’nin doğruluğuna dair verdiği gerekçeler 
(1)’in doğruluğu ile – McGinn’in kendisinin de varsaydığı, ‘doğalcı’ ve  ‘yapıcı’ 
terimlerinin standart yorumlarını hesaba kattığımızda – çelişik durumdadır.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gizemcilik, zihin-beden problemi, bilişsel kapalılık, Colin 
McGinn 
There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there 
is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and 
(2) we human beings are in principle incapable of solving the mind-body 
problem. The combination of these two claims seems hard to digest. The 
falsity of (1) would be a plausible explanation of (2): it would be no wonder 
that we cannot provide a naturalistic solution to a problem for which no 
naturalistic solution exists. However, if (1) is true, how are we to account 
for the truth of (2)? Or conversely, does not the truth of (2) provide us with 
a good reason to believe that (1) is false?
I believe that (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail 
the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn 
presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of 
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(1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’and 
‘constructive, which McGinn himself seems to take granted. 
McGinn defines the mind-body problem that he claims we cannot 
solveas follows:
How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain 
states? How can technicolor phenomenology arise from soggy 
grey matter? What makes the bodily organ we call the brain so 
radically different from other bodily organs, say the kidneys 
– the body parts without a trace of consciousness? How could 
the aggregation of millions of individually insentient neurons 
generate subjective awareness? We know that brain are the 
de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, 
no understanding whatever of how this can be so (pp. 394-5).1
The problem here concerns what is commonly called phenomenal 
consciousness, which McGinn himself calls “the hard nut of the mind-
body problem” (p. 394). It is the problem of understanding how the 
(phenomenally) conscious mind is related to the brain. McGinn grants that 
we know enough about the mind-body relation to know that conscious 
mental states are caused by brain states but the question is how we are 
to explain this very relation that we know holds between those different 
states. The relation between the conscious mind and the brain “strikes 
us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic” (p. 395) and the mind-body 
problem is “the problem of understanding how the miracle is wrought, 
thus removing the sense of deep mystery” (p. 395).
McGinn’s initial diagnosis of our bafflement about the possibility of 
there being a causal relation between consciousness and the brain is that 
“[n]euraltransmissions just seem like the wrong kind of materials with 
which to bring consciousness into the world” (p. 395). The astonishment 
we feel about the possibility of a causal relation between consciousness 
and the brain is often expressed by a question of the form “how can this 
(consciousness) be caused that (the brain)?” The problem is that brains 
do not seem to be radically different from other bodily organs in a way 
that would support an explanation of how the All page references are 
to McGinn (1989), unless otherwise noted. former but not the latter give 
1  All page references are to McGinn (1989), unless otherwise noted.
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rise to conscious mental states. Of course, a brain is different from, say, a 
kidney in term of its physical features and structures; however, the point 
is that the way it is different seems not to provide an explanation of what 
makes it responsible from consciousness.2
According to McGinn, the sense of mystery can be removed by 
having a theory that “describes the link between consciousness and the 
brain in a way that is no more remarkable (or alarming) than the way 
we now describe the link between the liver and bile” (p. 362). That the 
liver secretes bile might have been thought of as magical or mysterious to 
someof us who does not have a theory that explains how this is possible. 
Thanks to our current level of anatomical knowledge, there is now nothing 
magical for us about the secreting relation that holds between the liver 
and bile. McGinn holds that a theory that is intended to resolve the sense 
of mystery attached to the causal relation between consciousness and the 
brain needs to meet a similar adequacy constraint: it must explain how the 
brain “secretes” consciousness in a way relevantly similar to the way an 
anatomical theory explains how the liver secretes bile.3
McGinn argues that our situation with respect to an explanatory 
theory of the relation between consciousness and the brain is such that 
thetheory is in principle beyond our cognitive reach. “What I want 
to suggest is that,” McGinn writes, “the nature of the psychophysical 
connection has a full and non-mysterious explanation in a certain science, 
but this science is inaccessible to us a matter of principle” (p. 401). A thesis 
that is central to McGinn’s overall position is that we are precluded in 
principle from understanding the correct scientific theory that accounts 
for the causal nexus between consciousness and the brain. Let us call this 
thesis the inaccessibility thesis.4
McGinn articulates the inaccessibility thesis in terms of the notion of 
cognitive closure, which he defines as follows:
A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a property P(or 
theory T) if and only if the concept-forming procedures at M’s disposal 
cannot extend to a grasp of P (or an understanding of T) (p. 395).
2  For further discussion, see Demircioğlu (2015).
3  Note the famous materialist dictum of the 18th century French physiologist Pierre Cannabis: 
   “The brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile.” 
4  The inaccessibility thesis entails (2) on the plausible assumption that solving the mind-body 
    problem requires understanding the relevant correct scientific theory. For the purposes of this 
    paper, I will take (2) and the inaccessibility thesis to be equivalent.
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According to McGinn, “we are cognitively closed with respect to that 
property [P of the brain that accounts naturalistically for consciousness]” 
(p. 396). On his view, we are cut off from achieving a conception of that 
natural property of the brain that accounts for the psychophysical link. 
We cannot, in McGinn’s own words, “grasp,” “represent,” “specify,” 
“identify,” “understand” or “arrive at” that natural property. Further, 
McGinn holds that our cognitive closure with respect to P entails and 
explains our cognitive closure with respect to T: it is because we cannot 
access to P that accounts for the psychophysical link that we cannot access 
to T that makes an essential appeal to P.5
Can there really be some properties (or concepts of those properties) to 
which we are cognitively closed? If the answer is no, then the inaccessibility 
thesis is false. However, the answer seems to be a clear yes if we reject a 
sort of idealism according to which to be is to be conceived. If the world 
exists independently of our conceptual capacities, then it is surely possible 
that some of its features are beyond our cognitive reach. I believe McGinn 
is completely within his rights when he makes the following claims about 
the possibility of cognitive closure:
Only a misplaced idealism about the natural world could warrant 
the dogmatic claim that everything is knowable by the human 
species at this stage of its evolutionary development (consider the 
same claim made on behalf of the intellect of cro-Magnon man) (p. 
397).
Nothing, at least, in the concept of reality shows that everything real 
is open to the human concept-formingfaculty – if, that is, we are 
realists about reality (p. 395).
McGinn is right to think that realism entails that there might be some 
properties that are cognitively inaccessible by us. If realism is correct, then 
there is no guarantee that the limits of our minds coincide with the limits 
of reality; and, if they do not coincide, then we are cognitively closed 
with respect to some properties instantiated by reality. It appears that 
the possibility of cognitive closure simply follows from realism and some 
innocuous assumptions about a particular object’s being independent 
5  McGinn writes: “That P is (as we might say) noumenal for M does not show that P does not 
    occur in some naturalistic scientific theory T – it shows only that T is not cognitively accessible 
   to M” (p. 395).
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from some other object’s conceiving it. 
If, assuming “realism about reality,” cognitive closure is possible, 
then the psychophysical link appears to be at least as a good candidate for 
being a feature to which we are cognitively closed as any other feature of 
the world:
It may be that every property for which we can form a concept is such 
that it could never solve the mind-body problem. We could be like 
five-year old children trying to understand Relativity Theory (p. 397).
McGinn’s paper involves a rich stock of colorful possibility claims: we 
might be like traditional theologians finding themselves conceding 
cognitive closure with respect to certain of the properties of God, or like a 
Humean mind working with strictly empirical principles and yet trying to 
understand the physical world, or like a creature without spatial concepts 
trying to understand the possibility of motion. 
Realism (about reality) entails the possibility of cognitive closure 
with respect to the conscious mind, and the possibility of that sort of 
cognitive closure means that (1) and (2) are compatible: the mind-body 
problem might have a naturalistic and constructive solution to which we 
have no cognitive access as a matter of principle. The relation between 
the conscious mind and the brain might be accountable for in naturalistic 
terms by a scientific theory without that theory being a possible object of 
our cognition.
Of course, to say that it is possible that our minds are cognitively closed 
to us is not to say that our minds are cognitively closed to us. Obviously, 
possibility does not entail actuality. Realism may move some significant 
way towards establishing the former but we need some extra reasons to 
think that what is claimed to be possible is actual. Realism tells us that 
some of the features of the world might be cognitively closed to us; but it 
does not tell whether there are actually any such features and, if there are, 
which features they are. 
What reasons does McGinn provide us to hold that the inaccessibility 
thesis is true (and not merely possibly true)? McGinn’s argument develops 
at three stages. First, he argues that we cannot get to P through introspection 
or by analyzing concepts that are introspection-based. Second, he argues 
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that we cannot get to P through a systematic empirical study of the brain 
or by making inferences from what that empirical study might possibly 
provide us with. Finally, given that these are the “two possible avenues 
open to us in our aspiration to identify P” (p. 397), we cannot get to P full 
stop.  
I will not be concerned with the first and third stages of the argument 
(though this is not to say that interesting issues do not arise at those 
stages). I will focus on the second stage and argue that the reasons 
McGinn provides us with for the futility of empirical research exclude the 
possibility of a naturalistic solution of the mind-body problem.
At the second stage, McGinn argues inter alia that we are perceptually 
closed with respect to P: P is an imperceptible feature of the brain (or “is 
noumenal with respect to perception of the brain” (p. 398)). We cannot 
perceive P by “looking harder at” (p. 399) the brain. 
It is clear that the imperceptibility of P(partially) explainswhy, as 
McGinn claims, we cannot get to P through empirical studies of the brain: 
the obvious connection is that empirical studies (partially) depend upon 
or are restricted bywhat is perceivable by us. The important question is, 
however, why we should believe that P is imperceptible: how on earth can 
there be a property of the brain that is principally closed to perception?
McGinn’s argument for the imperceptibility of P rests on the 
following conditional premises as well as the premise that P explains the 
psycho-physical link: 
(P-S) If P is perceptual, then P is spatial.
(S-NE) If P is spatial, then it cannot explain the psycho-physical link.
In support of (P-S), McGinn writes:
[T]he senses are geared to representing a spatial world; they 
essentially represent things in space with spatially defined 
properties… The senses are responsive to certain kinds of properties 
– those that are essentially bound up with space…Kant was right, 
the form of outer sensibility is spatial (p. 399).
In support of (S-NE), McGinn writes:
[I]t is precisely such[spatial] properties that seem inherently incapable 
of resolving the mind-body problem: we cannot link consciousness to 
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the brain in virtue of spatial properties of the brain. There the brain 
is, an object of perception, laid out in space, containing spatially 
distributed processes; but consciousness defies explanation in such 
terms. Consciousness does not seem made up out of smaller spatial 
processes; yet perception of the brain seems limited to revealing such 
processes… [N]o spatial property will ever deliver a satisfying answer 
to the mind-body problem (p. 399).
The point I want to emphasize is that on McGinn’s account, P is not 
only imperceptible but also non-spatial. The premise that P explains the 
psycho-physical link and (S-NE) together entail the non-spatiality of P. 
In the final analysis, the overall picture that emerges from McGinn’s 
argument for the inaccessibility thesis is as follows. The inaccessibility 
thesis is true, according to McGinn, on account of the fact that the feature 
P of the brain that explains the psychophysical link is not open to (human) 
perception. The reason why Pis perceptually closed to perception is that 
no conceivable perceptible feature can explain the psychophysical link, 
and this is in turn because no conceivable spatial feature can explain the 
psychophysical link. The move from perceptibility to spatiality is based on 
the idea that all perceptual features are spatial. So, a basic reason McGinn 
provides for the truth of the inaccessibility thesis is that P, that feature of 
the brain that explains the psychophysical link, is non-spatial. 
I believe there are good reasons to think that the non-spatiality of P 
provides some (at least prima facie) support for the inaccessibility thesis. 
It is highly plausible that if P is non-spatial, then it is not perceivable 
(imagining perceiving non-spatial things is very hard, to say the least). 
Further, if P is not perceivable, then what might initially seem to be a 
serious candidate for being the route to P turns out not to be a candidate 
at all. 
However, the problem I want to press is that if what makes the 
inaccessibility thesis (or (2) above) true is, at least in part, that P is non-
spatial, then it is hard to see how (1) can be true, i.e. how there can be a 
naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem. 
How can there be a naturalist solution of the mind-body problem 
if the property that explains the link between the two is not spatial? In 
order to appreciate the force of the question, one only needs to pay some 
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attention to the reason why we take,for instance, Cartesian dualism to be 
a non-naturalistic theory. Consider, for instance, McGinn’s own remarks 
about “supernatural” solutions:
[One] form [of the solutions to the mind-body problem], which 
has been historically dominant, frankly admits that nothing 
merely natural could do the job, and suggests instead that we 
invoke supernatural entities or divine interventions. Thus we have 
Cartesian dualism and Leibnizian pre-established harmony (p. 395).
It is clear that Cartesian dualism holds that nothing merely natural could 
do the job if this means that nothing spatial could do the job. Cartesian 
dualism maintains that there is no naturalist solution of the mind-body 
problem if a naturalist solution requires that mental states (or thoughts) 
be the states of a spatial object. The root idea of Cartesian dualism is that 
the solution of the mind-body problem is possible only on the condition 
that mental states are taken to be the states of a non-spatial stuff. 
So, the reason why we do not classify Cartesian dualism as a naturalist 
solution is that it is committed to the thesis that nothing spatial could do 
the job of solving the mind-body problem. Now, if this is so, then by parity 
of reasons, McGinn’s mysterianism that holds that nothing spatial could 
do the job is also committed to the thesis that there can be no naturalist 
solution of the mind-body problem. The upshot is that McGinn’s invoking 
the idea of the non-spatiality of P undermines his initial commitment to a 
naturalist solution of the problem.6
How can there be a constructive solution of the mind-body problem 
if the property that explains the link between the two is not spatial? To 
see how McGinn himself conceives the idea of a constructive solution, 
consider the follow passage:
One form [of the solutions to the mind-body problem], which we 
may call constructive, attempts to specify some natural property 
of the brain (or body) which explains how consciousness can 
6 Of course, Cartesian dualism is a sort of substance dualism but not merely a sort of property 
  dualism. However, what makes it “non-naturalist” is not simply the fact that it is a form of 
 substance dualism but the non-spatiality of one of those two putatively fundamental 
   substances. And if this is true, then a sort of property dualism that advocates the non-spatiality 
   of one of the fundamental properties must also count as “non-naturalist.” I would like to thank 
  Eylem Özaltun for pressing on this issue.
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be elicited from it. Thus functionalism, for example, suggests a 
property – namely, causal role – which is held to be satisfied by 
both brain states and mental states; this property is supposed to 
explain how conscious states can come from brain states (p. 395).
McGinn holds that a constructive solution proceeds by identifying a 
property that is shared by both kinds of states. I believe this is reasonable: 
there can be no constructive account of how a state can give rise to another, 
entirely heterogeneous state. A necessary condition for a constructive 
solution appears to be there being at least one common property shared 
by different kinds of states.
Now, if P is non-spatial, then it is not clear that there is any feature 
that it shares with spatial properties of the brain and that can be deployed 
in a constructive account.7 Spatiality appears to be such a fundamental 
kind to which properties might belong that no property that does not 
fall under that kind can be given a constructive account in terms of those 
properties that do fall under it. Being spatial appears to be such a generic 
condition (as McGinn himself alludes to, something like a Kantian form) 
that no two properties can share some interesting features unless they are 
both spatial. The idea that P is non-spatial cuts the ties it might have had 
with the ordinary, spatial properties of the brain so severely that whatever 
hopes one might have had for a constructive solution appears to be dashed. 
The point to be emphasized is that, on McGinn’s account, P is not 
merely conceived as non-spatial but is non-spatial. McGinn does not 
argue that there is a spatial property of the brain that we somehow 
inescapably conceive as non-spatial due to the peculiarity of our cognitive 
mechanisms but he argues that P is non-spatial. McGinn makes a point 
about the metaphysical nature of P, not merely a point about our epistemic 
situation with respect to P. In fact, on his account, what explains our 
cognitive closure with respect to P is the very metaphysical nature of P, its 
non-spatiality. 
If McGinn’s point about P concerns its metaphysical nature, that 
is, if P is non-spatial and not merely a property thatwe conceive as non-
spatial, then I believe the remarks above pointing at the impossibility of a 
7 Of course, there are some uninteresting features like being a property that is had both by P 
  and spatial properties of the brain. Evidently, however, they are unhelpful when it comes to 
   providing a constructive solution to the mind-body problem.
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constructive explanation of P in terms of the spatial properties of the brain 
stand to reason. The possibility of a constructive explanation would not 
be excluded if P were a spatial property that is merely conceived as non-
spatial but, as I have argued, this is not the case on McGinn’s view.
The upshot is that the thesis of the non-spatiality of P, upon which 
McGinn’s defense of (2)(or the inaccessibility thesis) rests, entails the 
falsity of (1), another central thesis of McGinn’s mysterianism: if P is non-
spatial, then there is no naturalist and constructive solution of mind-body 
problem. I agree with McGinn that (1) and (2) are consistent but this is not 
to say that every thesis that one might appeal to for defending (2) accords 
with (1). The idea behind the thesis of the non-spatiality of P is that nothing 
spatial can generate consciousness, and this very idea is what motivates 
the Cartesian dualism to stipulate the existence of non-spatial stuff. If 
the reason why we do not call the Cartesian dualism as naturalistic is its 
commitment to the thesis that nothing spatial can do the job, as it seems 
to be, then no account like McGinn’s that makes the same commitment 
can reasonably hope for a naturalistic solution. Further, there can be no 
constructive solution of the mind-body problem if P is non-spatial. This is 
because if P is non-spatial, then P can share no (interesting) features with 
the spatial features of the brain and also because if there are no common 
features, then there can be no constructive solution.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Koç University 
Philosophy Department colloquium in December, 2015. I would like to 
thank all the participants for their helpful suggestions. I am grateful also 
to an anonymous referee for valuable comments. 
Erhan Demircioğlu, Koç Üniversitesi, Türkiye
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